First, letâs present the OKCupid explanation:
Suppose youâre a man whoâs really into someone. If you suspect other men are uninterested, it means less competition. You therefore have an added incentive to send a message. You might start thinking: maybe sheâs lonely. . . maybe sheâs just waiting to find a guy who appreciates her. . . at least I wonât get lost in the crowd. . . maybe these small thoughts, plus the fact that you really think sheâs hot, prod you to action. You send her the perfectly crafted opening message.
âsupâ
On the other hand, a woman with a preponderance of â4âČ votes, someone conventionally cute, but not totally hot, might appear to be more in-demand than she actually is. To the typical man considering her, sheâs obviously attractive enough to create the impression that other guys are into her, too. But maybe sheâs hot enough for him to throw caution (and grammar) to the wind and send her a message. Itâs the curse of being cute.
In some ways this was the model that my college roommate was espousing. His argument was that the key was to find a woman who you found more attractive than the average bear. That way, you were in a better bargaining position to select good mates from this pool of women, who donât necessarily know their own leverage over you, because they have to assume that youâre the typical male. The âwin-winâ scenario is where two people perceive each other to be better âcatchesâ than the general population when it comes to looks. There are a lot of such cases presumably because of the residual you see above, but there are plenty of other factors in mates where one can be choosy. By maximizing the disjunction between between population-wide assessment of attractiveness and your own perception of a womanâs attractiveness you can ânegotiateâ for someone âbetterâ on the other characteristics you value than you otherwise might be able to. If you want to be happy the key isnât to find a woman you find ugly, it is to find a woman who you value more than the going âmarketâ rate.
Alex Tabarrok has another plausible explanation:
âŠ.Rather I think there are certain types of beauty that greatly attract some men but repel others. Analagously, some people will pay hundreds of dollars for an ounce of caviar that other people wonât eat for free. The reason some people love caviar, however, is not that other people dislike it. Instead, it just so happens, that the thing that some people love is the very thing that repels others. We see the same phenomena in art, some people love John Cage, other people would rather listen to nothing at allâŠ.
Alexâs model is not totally exclusive of the one OKCupid was espousing. Both of them clearly suggest that distinctiveness matters. Individuals have their own âbrands,â and accentuating brands can allow for your âmarket segmentâ to target you. Back during my 2 weeks of internet dating I put âatheistâ under religion, and indicated that I did not want inquiries from someone who was religious. I was well aware that this was putting me into a âsausage surplusâ market, as there seems to be a preponderance of males among those who espouse such frank irreligiosity. But I recall hoping that my honesty about this would at least attract the attention of women who shared a similar disinclination toward religion (this turned out be a good move, a woman who was raised Jehovahâs Witness but had left religion contacted me). That being said, I did have my limits. I did not play up the fact that I was a Republican, as I judged that the pool of atheist Republican women in Portland, Oregon (where I lived at the time), was very small. It must also be admitted that my personal experience is that similar politics is less important in the success of a relationship than a common âmetaphysic.â In my case this is partly probably a function of a general weak passion for politics at this stage of my life. But even when I was a very strident libertarian politics was never a litmus test for relationships and friendships.
But there may be genuine differences which are not so temporally or cultural sensitive. Another component of the third dimension of assessment of attractiveness is probably just individual differences. The domain of behavior genetics, as opposed to evolutionary psychology. There are after all âlegsâ and âbreastsâ and âbuttâ men. Granted, the proportions vary across cultures, but there nevertheless remains a mix in most cultures of preferences. I believe this aspect is the one that may explain much of the pattern in the OKCupid results. There are men who prefer very small breasts, men who prefer corpulent women, and so forth. Whatever the origin of these preferences, even assuming relative cultural invariance in the sample population (I believe this is so for the middle to upper middle class Western target audience of OKCupid) there will remain individual differences of taste and preference, as noted by Alex Tabarrok. Women sharply deviated from the population norm on many traits may produce an average decline in aggregate attractiveness rating, but still may command a premium among the target audience of men who prefer the deviated traits (e.g., attractiveness drops as the number and extremity of piercings increases for the general population, but increases for a minority who find that attractive). Quite often it is preferable to be a second choice, but in this case women who are blandly âcuteâ may suffer because of the way in which men allocate their time and energy. Dating sites such as OKCupid have many more potential target matches than not, so why not focus on those individuals with whom one is the best match with, instead of the second best? In this way OKCupid is perhaps very different from the small villages or tribes of yore; you have thousands of âfirst matches.â
Finally, I want to observe something about the images on the OKCupid post. Quite often it seemed that the women who had higher variance ratings used more salient photos, with harsher or higher key lighting. A woman who uses a classic âMySpace angleâ photo thatâs a touch on the blurry side may get higher ratings than a woman who uses a more crisp image without makeup, but I suspect that many men would prefer the latter to the former. One canât rate someone lower just for being clever with lighting and selection biasing, but, one may change oneâs behavior explicitly and implicitly taking that into account.
In any case, Iâve gone on long enough. I was asked my opinion, and I gave it. Whatâs your take? (this is not a call for retarded comments by the way. You know who you are)
Image credit: Xavier449, Bollywood Hungama, Lili Ferraz.
Wat betreft de voorlaatste alinea over de fotokwaliteit, ook dat is geanalyseerd, zie alhier bij OKCupid, en voor de šnon-shared environmentš kan men ook op OKCupid terecht.
Het gaat er volgens mij om dat de aantal ontvangen berichten toeneemt als er een groter meningsverschil over de attractiviteit van de persoon in kwestie bestaat zoals OKCupid beweert en wat betreft de deviatiegraad en de variantiefunctie van OKCupid indien ze wel geldig is: mannen houden niet van ondernemende vrouwen maar wel van impulsieve chicks, weet je dan het resultaat? Dat mannen er ook niet van houden dat ze in een ander cafe zit dan in die ene waar hijzelf zit.
En .4*5 - .5*4 - .1*9 + .9*1 + k= nul berichten maar ook 19 kiezers waarvan 9 haar ondergemiddeld waarderen en 10 haar bovengemiddeld waarderen. En waarom stuurt ook die ene die haar perfect vindt geen bericht? Omdat die 9 die haar met een 4 waarderen ook niks doen, dat is niet counterintuitief, maar normaal als ze aan iedere vinger 10 man heeft waarbij die 9 afwachten wat die ene doet. En bij een ondergemiddelde waardering lijken de kiezers elkaar meer te steunen. Maw. in deze variantie of stemgedrag ontvangt men dus geen berichten.
Er zijn echter 49 manieren waarop 60 kiezers die eenmaal verplicht stemmen en toch nul berichten zullen versturen. Er zijn zelfs 1032 manieren om nul berichten te versturen als niet alle 60 kiezers hun stemmen verdelen en sommige zich dus van stemming onthielden, waardoor het gemiddelde dan zweeft bij 74,52% kiezers die dan wel eenmaal gestemd hebben.
En bij 5 verstuurde berichten ligt bij vrijwillige deelname aan stemming bij 60 kiezers het aantal manieren van waardering op 1418 en zweeft het gemiddeld aantal kiezers op 73,44%
Voor verschillende populatie grootte kan men de volgende grafiek beschouwen (en k van de formule buiten beschouwing is gelaten) waarbij op de x-as het aantal msgs en op de y-as het aantal varianties in de manier waarop men gewaardeerd kan worden bij dat specifiek aantal msgs (afb1a):
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afb 1a |
Het zig-zag patroon in de grafiek (afb 1a en 1b) waarbij dus 1 msgs meer word verstuurd bij een langzame vermindering of sprongsgewijze vermeerdering van manieren van waardering kan komen doordat men niet de kans wil laten ontglippen? Dan lijkt het erop dat 4 pogingen ongeveer de maximale moeite zijn, alhoewel het ook afhankelijk van de grootte van de populatie lijkt. (afb 1b)
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afb 1b |
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afb 2 |
Voor iedere populatie geldt dat de deelname aan stemming steeds begint onder de 75% (afb 2 en 3) en als 100% van de populatie wordt bereikt (afb 3) dan zijn er ook maximaal nog slechts 4 varianties van waardering. In het begin wil de lijn nog krullen (afb 2) en loopt deelname zelfs nog terug bij de eerste 10 berichten. Maar waarom het aantal varianties soms spronggewijs toeneemt bij een toenemende participatie of betrokkenheid is me niet duidelijk, kritische massa misschien?.
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afb 3 |
Het verschil tussen de verstuurde berichten bij het bereiken van 100% deelname van de verschillende populaties (afb 3) is steeds 13 of 14 msgs. maw. bij 15 mensen meer kan men ongeveer 13 msgs meer verwachten bij 100% deelname.
Om 125 msgs te ontvangen moet dus extrapolerend de populatiegrootte minimaal ongeveer 150 mensen zijn.
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afb 4 |
Op de lijn (afb 4) staan de populatiegroottes waarbij het aantal msgs (x-as) bij het maximale aan varianties (y-as) steeds verdubbelde.
Hoe groter de populatie hoe groter de kans op meer msgs. (afb 5)
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afb 5 |